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Abstract: Systematists have become increasingly aware of the limits imposed by the 
current system of nomenclature for accurately representing evolutionary relationships and 
managing efficiently names associated with clades. In reaction, a new system of 
nomenclature, the PhyloCode is being developed that fully recognizes the historical 
nature of taxonomy and the importance of the cladistics revolution. As a consequence, 
questions emerge about the new historical entities of systematics, questions that can be 
apprehended through the lens of epistemology, philosophy of language and metaphysics. 
What is the ontological nature of entities that lack any other essential features 
besides spatiotemporal properties? How to depart from the fixed realm of immutable and 
transcendental essence into a worldview wherein all biological entities are characterized 
by their temporality and materiality? What are the consequences of nomenclatural 
decisions on other sectors of biology? With the ever growing sequencing capacity and 
tree reconstructing abilities, our conceptualization of phylogenetic relationships is 
changing at an unprecedented pace. Then it begs the question, what prevents 
communication break down when the references of clades’ names are changing almost on 
a daily basis. These are some of the fundamental issues I am tackling in the present work.  
Addressing the ontological issue, I argue that species and clades are best 
perceived as mereological sums of individuals, which means that each biological 
individual is the unique individual composed of all its less inclusive individuals and 
nothing more.  
I propose to separate the meanings of “clade” and “monophyletic group”. I 
suggest to use “monophyletic” for an epithet referring to a defining property of a set (a 
natural kind) and “clade” for a noun which corresponds to a historical entity (an 
individual) resulting from evolutionary process. I present the idea that a phyloname is not 
attached to a single clade but to a natural kind containing as members the clades that 
would be selected in counterfactual phylogenies. The defining properties of this natural 
kind are provided by the phylogenetic definition.  
Finally I stress that taxonomists are also driven by the will to narrate the same sort 
of history, when they adjust the reference of names in light of new phylogenetic data, 
which leads me to submit that taxa can also be perceived as narratives. 
 
Keywords: PhyloCode, philosophy, systematics, individuality, natural kind, possible 
worlds, causal theory of reference 
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“…one significant point is that philosophers habitually seek only to erect internally 
consistent schemes. They have little to gain by attempting to discover how the living 
world really is organized, or how biologists in fact conceive of it. Hence although there 
has been much philosophizing about science, there has been little that truly deserves to be 
called the philosophy of science. The usual notions of the logicians are adequate enough 
that these can be applied to scientific classifications without breaking down. Something 
special was needed if logic were to cope with biology as it really is. This situation is 
unfortunate, for not only might philosophers have much to contribute, but they might 
learn something as well.” (Ghiselin, 1974). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How far does evolutionary thinking extend in biology? The question seems 
terribly naïve at first glance, since the appropriate quotation comes readily to mind: 
“Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution" (Dobzhansky, 
1964). No doubt that the publication of The Origin of Species triggered a paradigm shift 
whose influence transcends disciplines’ boundaries, as Ghiselin (1969: p. 1) asserts 
emphatically: “In 1859 there began what ultimately may prove to be the greatest 
revolution in the history of thought. The Origin of Species, published in November of that 
year, affected an immediate and cataclysmic shift in outlook, casting into doubt ideas that 
had seemed basic to man’s conception of the entire universe.” During the 1940’s The 
Modern Synthesis extended the influence of the evolutionary theory from the mere origin 
of species and enabled to unite all biological disciplines. Dobzhansky’s (1964) manifesto 
is often perceived as the triumph of the evolutionary theory, which became the central 
principle in biology, or so goes the usual story. Yet, a moment’s reflection reveals such 
perspective not to be fully justified. If we cast a less partisan eye on history, we observe 
that despite its explanatory power, biologists were not long to embrace the molecular 
revolution and soon evolution lost its role as an integrative theory. Molecules, gene and 
DNA are today conceptual pillars in biology.  
During the 1960’s cladistics and then later in the 1990’s the refinement of 
computing methods brought a renewed interest in the theory of evolution especially in 
systematics. As a consequence systematics is now considered as a mature science in the 
popperian sense, meaning it is a science able to generate and test phylogenetic 
hypotheses, but also to arrange these hypotheses into a system. As emphasized by 
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Griffiths (1976), modern systematics deals no more with classification, the arrangement 
of objects into classes on the basis of properties of the objects being classified. Instead, in 
its modern form, systematics handles a vast array of concepts and methods that purport to 
arrange the identified elementary objects into larger wholes. Genealogical relationships 
form the cement that enables the constituent objects to bear the relation of connected 
parts to the whole. The goal of modern systematics is to group organisms into taxa, which 
may or may not be monophyletic, and to rank those taxa into a hierarchy of taxonomic 
categories. Under the traditional rank based system, naming hinges on ranking, which 
determines the ending of the name, and on selecting a type, which provides the stem for 
the name. Furthermore the role of the type is to anchor a name into biological reality. At 
the end of the process every taxonomic object is endowed with a name, a rank and a type. 
 The introduction of cladistic philosophy instigated a change of perspective in the 
way systematists view taxa, at least at the levels above species, which hereafter 
correspond to monophyletic groups of species. However difficulties arise for the 
traditional system when the Tree of Life is perceived as a fundamentally continuous 
historical entity, which ends with the extant organisms and begins with their last common 
ancestor. Recognizing this continuity forces us to admit that ranks do no correspond to 
any natural feature and as a corollary any division of this continuum is a priori as valid as 
any other. Ranking does indeed rely on subjective judgments from the taxonomist who 
takes simultaneously into account different kinds of information such as the size of the 
taxon, the morphological gap to other taxa or the ranks of neighboring taxa. Because it 
generates endless debates on the appropriate level for a taxon in the hierarchy, ranking is 
a cause of nomenclatural instability. It is thus incumbent on the traditional system to 
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adopt a fully objective method for ranking, but the proposed solutions (see for instance 
Hennig, 1966; Sibley & Ahlquist, 1990; Avise & Johns, 1999) fail to conciliate 
objectivity with communication ease. An additional difficulty in this system pertains to 
the link between names and ranks, in which rank changes might induce cascading series 
of names changes (Hibbett & Donoghue, 1998). 
 In sum, systematists have become increasingly aware in recent years of the limits 
imposed by the current system for accurately representing evolutionary relationships and 
managing efficiently names associated with clades. In reaction, a new system of 
nomenclature, the PhyloCode (Cantino & de Queiroz, 2007) is being developed. Unlike 
the traditional system, the PhyloCode does not enforce any ranking requirement and 
concerns itself solely with the names of clades, leaving the thorny issue of species 
naming to traditional systems (Dayrat et al., 2007). This new system intends to provide 
clades both with unambiguous names and precise temporal boundaries. Under this new 
approach, systematists can freely select and name any part in a phylogeny, depending on 
their communication requirements and this without further concerns about its appropriate 
rank. The resulting classification is constructed out of clades included into other clades 
and thus reflects the shape of the Tree of Life. With the PhyloCode, the scientific 
community has the opportunity to extend tree thinking into nomenclature and by doing so 
to acknowledge the fully historical nature of systematics.  
The main outcome of the Darwinian revolution, the importance of the mechanism 
of natural selection notwithstanding, was to introduce the concept of time at the heart of 
biological reflection. The prominent influence of The Modern Synthesis during the 1950s 
and the widespread acceptance of phylogenetic trees, that followed the cladistic 
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revolution, are all signs of the historical turn in biology. Interestingly the same trend has 
been observed in other conceptually remote disciplines during the second half of the 20th 
century. Most notably for our purpose, interest in the temporal dimension rose during the 
same era in epistemology, philosophy of language and ontology. In epistemology, Kuhn 
(1962) and Feyerabend (1975) appealed to history and sociology to show that the 
dynamics of science proceeds from factors other than purely cognitive. In philosophy of 
language, Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980) theorized the persistence of communication 
despite the impermanence of the sense associated with words. Finally in ontology, 
Ghiselin, (1966) and Hull (1976) challenged the reigning view inherited from classical 
logic that entities in systematics are best thought of as natural classes defined by eternal 
essences. They proposed that they rather should be apprehended as individuals, that is, as 
historical objects devoid of necessary and sufficient properties. These three disciplines 
might provide us with the conceptual tools to prolong the Darwinian revolution in 
systematics and beyond in biology.  
What is the ontological nature of entities that lack any other essential features 
besides spatiotemporal properties? How to depart from the fixed realm of immutable and 
transcendental essence into a worldview wherein all biological entities are characterized 
by their temporality and materiality? What are the consequences of nomenclatural 
decisions on other sectors of biology? With the ever growing sequencing capacity and 
tree reconstructing abilities, our conceptualization of phylogenetic relationships is 
changing at an unprecedented pace. Then it begs the question, what prevents 
communication break down when the references of clades’ names are changing almost on 
a daily basis. These are some of the fundamental issues I am tackling in the present work. 
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During my thesis, I was driven by the excitement of exploring philosophical realms, very 
distant from what I had been acquainted with during my biological training. Yet, I was 
struck to learn that philosophers are interested in the very same issues I intended to 
address, which prompted my attempt to import some philosophical tools into systematics. 
As a result, it allowed me to deal with the above problems but also it poses new questions 
that might in turn challenge philosophers.  
Although, Dobzhansky was premature in believing that the Gestalt shift had 
already occurred, he anticipated a direction toward which biology is currently heading. 
Consequently, my overall project is to foster the expansion of evolutionary thinking 
toward a biological frame in which every single object, from the units considered in 
conservation biology to the concept used by metaphysicians, would be historical in 
nature. This core ambition explains the breadth of subjects encountered in the present 
thesis. Measures of biological diversity, history of classification and phylogenetic 
nomenclature are some of the important concepts I have been manipulating. Furthermore, 
this work has the ambition to contribute in the design of coherent framework in 
systematics that shed light on the ontological nature of its entities and understanding on 
how these entities are causally related. Therefore this thesis should also be received as a 
work in metaphysics of biology. 
Before turning to my own contribution, I wish to introduce the main theoretical 
concepts and tools I have appealed to. Firstly, an explanation of the PhyloCode’s 
foundations is required in order to understand some problems resulting from its 
application. Secondly, I will present the two fundamental categories used in ontological 
claims, namely individuals and natural kinds. Thirdly, I will outline the causal theory of 
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reference, cornerstone of the contemporary philosophy of language. Directly related to 
the previous theory, the theory of possible worlds will be the focus of the last part. The 
possible worlds theory stems from the development of modal logic (i.e. the logic of 
necessity, possibility and contingency). Although this theory proved to have a high 
heuristic value, it is not unified yet and still encompasses number of dissenting views. 
Due to its controversial aspects I will not paint a complete representation of the theory 
and will only provide a short introduction to some of its most promising features to 
analyze modality issues in systematics.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
THE PHYLOCODE 
Most of the current draft’s key features were already present in de Queiroz & Gauthier’s 
(1990, 1992, 1994) introductory articles. As for any system of nomenclature the prime 
function of the PhyloCode is to provide its users with directions on which entities should 
be recognized in this system and once they are recognized on how to name them. At this 
stage, the PhyloCode concerns only the naming of clades, defined as monophyletic 
groups of species. Although it does not preclude the naming of para- and polyphyletic 
groups, the PhyloCode discourages it and their names would not be managed by this 
system. In the PhyloCode the choice of a phylogenetic reconstruction precedes naming. 
Admittedly, the systematist does not intend to name every single clade in the phylogeny, 
but focuses on the groups that are the most relevant for his purpose. Attention could be 
drawn on a particular clade because of its importance in past debates, the presence of 
some significant characters or because of its special position in the tree. 
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The main feature introduced by the PhyloCode is the phylogenetic definition. 
Though it could be argued that the current rank based system is also using some sort of 
implicit definitions based on ranks and types, the PhyloCode departs from it by uniquely 
associating a name with an explicit phylogenetic definition. The phylogenetic hypothesis 
that provides a context for coining the initial phylogenetic is called the reference 
phylogeny. When formulating the phylogenetic definitions, the PhyloCode uses 
specimens and characters present in the reference phylogeny that have been dubbed 
specifiers. They function analogously to types in the rank based system in anchoring a 
name into biological reality and thus providing reference points for inferring the 
extensions of names. Phylogenetic definitions purport to identify the referent of a name, 
in any phylogeny where the definition applies. In theory this identification is meant to be 
unambiguous even in cases when the hypotheses depart radically from the reference 
phylogeny. 
The PhyloCode proposes a repertoire of phylogenetic definitions that enables to 
name any portion of a tree. It can be narrowed down to three main definitional types, 
which might in turn be combined with each others. Using the specimens A and B and the 
character state M as specifiers, examples of referent clades associated with each type of 
definition are for a node-based definition, “the clade stemming from the last common 
ancestor of A and B”, for a branch-based definition, “the clade consisting of A and all 
organisms or species that share a more recent common ancestor with A than with B” and 
for an apomorphy-based definition, “the clade originating with the first organism or 
species to possess apomorphy M as inherited by A". As a consequence a name is attached 
to a definition and in ordinary practice the name’s referent is identified automatically 
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without requiring any taxonomic judgment. However, an extraordinary situation 
corresponds to the acceptance of hypotheses, wherein circumscriptions of taxa are 
profoundly modified in comparison with the reference phylogeny. In such cases, the 
systematist might sever the link between a name and a definition, and propose a 
redefinition that aims to capture the conceptualization in term of the taxon content 
initially intended by the author of the definition. The systematist has two options for 
intervening on the wording of a previously published definition. The first possibility is an 
unrestricted emendation that is a modification, which contrary to a restricted 
emendation, do not require approval by the elected Committee for Phylogenetic 
Nomenclature (CPN). Unrestricted emendations may modify the specifiers or the 
qualifying clauses, but must retain the same definitional type and the same clade category 
(crown clade or total clade) if specified. The second possibility may involve changes in 
specifiers, definition type, clade category and/or definitional type. One of the central 
principles in the PhyloCode is that it does not infringe upon the freedom of taxonomist 
with respect to inferring the composition of taxa. As a consequence, it is silent on the 
requirements for making emendations, stating merely that they should be derived from an 
interest of stability in terms of taxon composition and/or diagnostic characters (Article 
15.1.1). This state of affair seems to me quite unfortunate especially concerning 
unrestricted emendations. Indeed without precise guidance, systematists might revert to 
the old habit of changing taxon definitions to fit their favorite circumscription. Due to the 
shape of the tree, in many cases the exact taxa composition cannot be maintained and 
several solution do equally approximate it. Thus, as demonstrated in articles 2 and 3, 
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conflict could arise about the best emendation, bringing havoc once again when we 
thought that nomenclatural stability had been achieved.  
 
INDIVIDUALS AND NATURAL KINDS 
Since its origin, metaphysics has been concerned with different ways of aggregating 
objects of the world in order to give us ways of thinking about many things as one thing. 
Individual and natural kind form the fundamental ontological pair, each of them captures 
a different part of reality. In that respect they should be perceived as a pair of contrasted 
terms each of which depends on the other for its meaning. Although, the words used for 
describing this opposition have varied, the associated concepts have remained remarkably 
stable over time, and represent modern developments of the Aristotelian theory of 
universals.  
 Natural kinds are defined by essences, which correspond to sets of necessary and 
sufficient properties. According to the classical approach, such essences are universal, 
immutable and eternal - they form the very matrix of reality. Consequently, a natural kind 
exists transcendentally, i.e. whether there are concrete objects instantiating it or not. 
Among mildly ill-informed logicians with respect to biological things, biological species 
are still considered to be paradigmatic cases of natural kinds (see Kriple, 1980). In 
biology, before Ghiselin (1966) formalized an alternative, the approach that treated 
species as natural kinds was the dominant view. To have the knowledge of the species 
tiger was to discover its essence. Candidates for essential properties were morphological 
traits, biochemical and genetic features (Bernier, 1984; Caplan, 1981; Kitts & Kitts, 1979 
and Kitcher, 1984). Hélas, once all the implications of the theory of evolution were taken 
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into account, the previous properties did not fit anymore the classical version of 
essentialism. Contrary to a widely held opinion, essentialism was a working hypothesis 
even after the acceptance of the evolutionary theory. As Sober (1980; 2000) demonstrates 
it, essentialism was able to accommodate itself with the gradual transformation of species 
in a similar manner that the transmutation of chemical elements did not undermine the 
periodical table. The fatal blow came from Galton’s insight that species were not made 
up of homogeneously populations and that heredity was a central cause of variation: 
“…variability within one generation is explained by appeal to variability in the previous 
generation and to facts about the transmission of variability” (Sober, 1993: 174).  For 
classical essentialism, variation was due to perturbations from an intrinsic natural state 
and to use Sober’s famous terminology, it had to be explained away in order to reach the 
true underlying necessary properties. This attitude contrasted with the newly developed 
framework of population genetics wherein variability per se was the subject of 
investigation. Furthermore, evolutionary arguments against the sufficiency requirement 
started to pile up once it was understood that convergence and inheritance of ancestral 
characters cause identical features to be present among distantly related species 
(Ereshefsky, 2001). The version of essentialism, which relies on intrinsic properties of 
organisms, felt in demise as it was realized that it was ill suited for the ontology of 
systematics. Notice that it does not entail that essentialism has no place in biology, 
merely that species and clades do not conform to the classical picture of natural kinds.  
 In contrast with natural kinds, the individuality thesis is not beset by the difficulty 
of identifying essences. This thesis states that species and clades are individuals 
(Ghiselin, 1966), which means they are concrete particulars that lack instances and 
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defining properties. They are historical entities that form spatiotemporally integrated and 
cohesive wholes (Ghiselin, 1974). The individuality thesis is currently the dominant 
position, but some have argued that it could be complemented by treating species and 
clades also as natural kinds. The authors of this proposal have widened the notion of 
essence to capture the historical aspect of organisms’ properties in the Darwinian era. The 
rational for reintroducing natural kinds is that they are kinds with explanatory and 
predictive values. According to LaPorte (2004: 19), many features of, for example, a 
polar bear can be explained and predicted by appealing to natural kinds it belongs to: “A 
lot is explained by an object’s being a polar bear. That is a polar bear explains why it 
raises cubs as it does, or why it has extremely dense fur, or why it swims long distances 
through icy water in search of ice floes. Similarly, there are theoretically satisfying 
answers as to why polar bears on the whole raise cubs as they do, or have dense fur, or 
swim for miles through icy water. The polar bear kind is a useful one for providing 
significant explanations. It is a natural kind.” The two main candidates for defining 
historical natural kinds  are essence associated with shared ancestry and essence that posit 
homeostatic mechanism. The former have been defended by Griffiths (1994) and LaPorte 
(2004). LaPorte (2004: 15) argues that any talk about a species individual could also be 
interpreted as a talk about a natural kind, because the organisms that are part of the 
species individual also share a common property: “Although the species-individual is not 
a kind but rather an individual, there is a property, for any such individual, of being part 
of that individual”. Both cladistic taxa based on purely genealogical considerations and 
the taxa of evolutionary taxonomists that account also for other type of information such 
as ecology and genetic differentiation count as perfectly cogent natural kinds for LaPorte. 
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Their naturalness consists in their explanatory values, but LaPorte stresses that 
naturalness comes in degree. The cladistic taxon is more natural when it comes to explain 
the genealogical relationships, whereas the evolutionary taxonomists’ taxon is more 
natural when there is a tradeoff between genealogical and say ecological explanations.  
The second category of natural kinds is defined by what Boyd has named 
homeostatic properties. Similarly to LaPorte’s account, taxa (species and clades) are not 
defined by necessary and sufficient conditions, are not necessary spatiotemporally 
unrestricted, do not fall under universal exceptionless laws, and have their members 
united by historical causes rather than by shared properties. But, for Boyd (1999) the 
causal relations uniting the members of a species are homeostatic properties exemplified 
by gene exchanges between populations, reproductive isolation, effects of common 
selective factors, coadapted gene complexes plus other limitations on heritable variation, 
and the effects of ecological niches. Rieppel (2005) extended the concept to encompass 
clades, wherein the homeostatic mechanisms should be searched among developmental 
homeostasis, developmental constraints and ontogenic entrenchments. Once the thesis 
that taxa are homeostatic properties clusters is adopted, the question remains whether 
they are also natural kinds. According to Boyd, the naturalness of natural kinds consists 
in their aptness for induction and explanation. Therefore the identification of natural 
kinds amounts to the identification of projectible generalizations (in the sense of 
Goodman, 1973), which concerns the property of certain generalizations to be extended 
or projected from examined instances of the kind to unexamined ones. Since our ability 
to identify species and their members is central to our aptitude to obtain correct 
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explanation and predictions in biological sciences, Boyd concludes that taxa defined by 
HPC are natural kinds.  
In the articles 4, 5 and 6 we build upon these accounts of historical essences but 
explore an alternative version of natural kinds more compatible with the individuality of 
species and clades. 
 
THE CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE 
Associated with the works of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, the causal theory of 
reference spawned a shift in philosophy of language in the early 1970s. This new theory 
of reference is motivated by the rejection of orthodox philosophy of semantics, held by 
Frege and to some extent by Russell, that certain expressions, in particular proper names, 
are non-connotative expressions. I will focus hereafter on Kripke’s account as it is 
exposed in his most influential work: Naming and Necessity (1980). The version of the 
theory of reference, attacked by Kripke, is the descriptive theory of reference. It is 
generally admitted in semantics that the way we determine the reference of an expression 
is by finding the reference of each of the terms that compose it. According to the 
descriptive theory every singular term receives, in addition to a denotation, or the object 
that the term refers to, a connotation, or a sense that provides the description of the 
referent. The sense of the term, thus, contains the features for identifying uniquely the 
referent of the term. 
In what follows, I will mainly discuss the issue of proper names used to pick out 
individual particulars. Kripke argued that the association of proper name with a single 
property might fail to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to identify a unique 
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referent. Rather, he proposed that the descriptive theory would be better off attributing to 
the referent a disjunctive cluster of properties. In turn, this cluster would be necessary and 
sufficient to identify the referent of the name as summarized by Kripke (1980: 71): “If 
most, or a weighted most, of the ϕ’s [cluster of properties] are satisfied by one unique 
object γ, then γ is the referent of ‘X’ [the proper name]. If the vote yields no unique 
object, ‘X’ does not refer.” For Kripke, this forces us to accept that this cluster of 
properties is essential to the entity that answers to the description. For instance, we 
identify the referent of ‘Aristotle’ by way of a description that identifies him uniquely 
(Greek philosopher, pupil of Plato, teacher of Alexander the Great) so it seems as an 
inevitable consequence that this description is based on Aristotle’s essential properties, 
those characteristics that make him Aristotle and nobody else. Kripke’s arguments 
against this version of a theory of meaning can be decomposed into modal and 
epistemological arguments (Salmon, 2005).  
The modal argument appeals to counterfactual situations and purports to show the 
fallacy of “the statement, If X exists, then X has most of the ϕ’s’ expresses a necessary 
truth” (Kripke, 1980: 71). Suppose that the following description “the man who won the 
American presidential election in 1968” gives the essential property of Nixon and that the 
name “Nixon” simply means “the person, whoever he or she may be, having these 
properties”, then according to the descriptive theory of reference, the sentence “Nixon is 
the man who won the American presidential election in 1968” is analytic. An analytic 
statement is, for Kripke, true in all counterfactual situations by virtue of its meaning. 
Consequently Kripke stipulates (p. 39): “Then something which is analytically true will 
be both necessary and a priori”. But, surely the argument continues, it is not necessary 
 14
that someone is Nixon if and only if that person is the man who won the American 
presidential election in 1968. In the first place it might have come to pass that someone 
else (e.g., Humphrey) won the elections in 1968. Hence the above sentence expresses a 
contingent truth, thus it not necessary for Nixon to have the property that we have 
attributed to him.  
The epistemological argument attacks the alleged a prioricity of descriptive 
statements summarized by “the statement ‘If X exists, then X has most of the ϕ’s’ is know 
a priori by the speaker” (Kripke, 1980: 71). As we know from the previous section, “if 
anyone is the winner of the American presidential election in 1968, then he is Nixon” is 
assumed analytic by the orthodox theory, which means that this sentence conveys 
information that is knowable a priori, knowable solely by reflection on the concept and 
without recourse to sensory experience. Yet, Kripke argued that such sentence might 
prove to be wrong that our memories are tricking us into forgetting that the winner of the 
1968 election was in fact Humphrey. It follows that the information conveyed by the 
sentence is in fact knowable a posteriory by recourse to sensory information, for instance 
by digging into the archives to check who was elected president in 1968. Therefore this 
second sentence is not analytic either.  
Together the modal and epistemological arguments showed that there are serious 
flaws in the claim that the referent of a proper name has any of the properties contained 
in its description commonly associated with it, let alone necessarily. Kripke proposed a 
better picture dubbed Causal theory of reference, which says that a name denotes a 
referent but does not connote any properties. In this scheme, the manner in which names 
are bestowed can be likened to christening by ostension, by the act of pointing or by 
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using a definite description. However this initial description plays only a role in fixing 
the reference of a name, it doesn’t convey any necessary and sufficient properties and can 
even be wrong. Once established, the reference of a name is spread to the rest of the 
linguistic community (Kripke, 1980: 96): “When a name is ‘passed from link to link’, the 
receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same 
reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the name ‘Napoleon’ and decide it 
would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition”. In this 
perspective, no matter the modal considerations we can imagine, no matter how our 
knowledge of the referent’s properties might be modified, the name would always pick 
out the same person. According to Kripke we can surrender the defining properties 
entailed by the descriptive theory of reference because proper names are rigid designator, 
they are names with the ability to refer to the same bearer in all possible worlds. The 
concept of rigid designator is intensively used most of the articles, but is central in the 
articles 5 and 6.  
 
THE POSSIBLE WORLDS THEORY 
There are several versions of possible worlds theories. The most influential 
formalizations are due to Kripke (1963; 1980) and Lewis (1968; 1986), although there are 
points of contact between them, the details pertaining to each theory and the motivations 
that lie behind each one differ. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke resorted to a version of 
the theory that takes possible worlds to be heuristic devices in the study of modality. 
According to it, possible worlds are stipulated not discovered. Each possible world 
corresponds to a counterfactual situation, to the world as we know it. Kripke explains 
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their construction (p. 44): “A possible world is given by the description we associate with 
it. What do we mean when we say ‘In some other possible world I would not have given 
this lecture today?’ We just imagine the situation where I didn’t decide to give this 
lecture or decided to give it on some other day. Of course, we don’t imagine everything 
that is true or false, but only those things relevant to my giving the lecture; but in theory, 
everything needs to be decided to make a total description of the world”.  
 According to the causal theory of reference, the truth-value of a sentence is a 
function of the truth-value of its parts. The only feature relevant to the truth-value of a 
single part is its referent. To assert something, amounts to designate a referent and to 
ascribe it a property. Hence in the proposition “Dunkerque is a harbor”, the proper name 
refers to a geographical object, the city of Dunkerque, whereas the common noun 
expresses the property of being a harbor. Thus the proposition is true, if and only if the 
referent of the name “Dunkerque” possesses effectively the property of being a harbor. In 
the possible worlds language, the referent of “Dunkerque” is an actualized possibility, 
because the actual city is present in the world you and me inhabit. But what about a 
modal proposition such as “if Dunkerque was totally destroyed during the war, it would 
have been necessarily rebuilt inland”? In this context, “Dunkerque” has no actual 
referent, because the city was not totally destroyed during the war. This begs the question 
how we should decide about the truth of this second proposition. This is where the 
mechanic of possible worlds springs into action. The solution consists in stipulating some 
possible worlds as close as possible from the actual world in every respect except that 
Dunkerque was totally destroyed during the war. Then each of the counterfactual worlds 
is examined in order to see if it includes the city of Dunkerque rebuilt inland. If in every 
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single possible world Dunkerque has been rebuilt inland, the reconstruction would have 
taken place necessarily inland, which entails that the proposition is true. If in some 
worlds the reconstruction is inland, whereas in some others it is localized on the seashore, 
the proposition is wrong. But the proposition that substitutes “possibly” for “necessarily” 
is true. For Kripke a proposition that is true in every possible world where it applies is 
said to be metaphysically necessary.  
 In the context of my work, the theory of possible worlds was used to investigate 
the necessary features of systematics’ objects. The procedure consisted in exporting each 
possible phylogeny in a world of its own and then in comparing the different worlds in 
order to discover which features were always present, i.e. which marked necessary 
conditions.  
 However there is a second potential benefit to use the possible worlds 
framework in phylogenetics, which I wish to explore further in the future. This idea, 
introduced by Lewis (1986) (and based on the work of R. Hilpinen, 1976) is centered 
around the premise that to come up with a good scientific theory is tantamount to find an 
explanation that is close to the truth. This closeness to the truth (“truthlikeness” or 
“verisimilitude”) is formalized in term of possible worlds closeness. Thus, Lewis writes 
(1986: 24): “A theory is close to the truth to the extent that our world resembles some 
world where that theory is exactly true. A true theory is closest to the truth, because our 
world is the world where the theory is true. As for false theories, the ones that can come 
true in ways that involve little dissimilarity to the world as it really is are thereby closer 
to the truth”. Lewis example, the approximate gas laws, helps to clarify this inferential 
model. When the laws are used without including correction terms the worlds where it 
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perfectly describes gas behavior (the worlds where the laws are true) are quite close from 
our world. But when we include some corrections “we get a theory that holds in some 
worlds that imitate ours still better, so the improved theory is still closer to the truth”. 
Consequently, this means that science proposes theories that hold true in some 
counterfactual worlds, it also means that we don’t know a priori, i.e. before testing them 
empirically, whether our world is the world where those theories are true or how close are 
these counterfactual worlds from our own. It emerges from this analysis that empirical 
science can be understood as the process of leafing through the atlas of possibilia, 
selecting one and confronting this possible world to the observation in order to infer 
(deductively, inductively, abductively or with an inferential mix of the previous modes) 
whether it is the actual world or how close it is from the actual world. I call actualization 
the process of selecting one possibilia as the world we actually live in. Of course, as 
Popper has thought us, this selection is only provisional since we cannot be certain that 
different theories, i.e. better possibilia, will not provide better accounts of the observation 
data. Scientific theories are entangled and cohesive explanatory wholes emerge from their 
interactions. Hence a modification of a given part might exert changes in verisimilitude in 
a wide range of other theories. Thus, some particular theory, we believed in when 
embedded in a given theoretic context, might show a drastic change in verisimilitude 
when reconsidered in a different theoretical environment. 
 In the possible worlds context, the aim of phylogenetics is not to reconstruct a 
tree, but to select a tree (or several equally “good” trees), i.e. in my terminology to 
actualize a tree, from a set of all possible trees. The selection procedure consists in 
confronting the phylogeny found in each possible world with the theoretical entities that 
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constitute the matrix of primary homologies. Therefore, actualization in phylogenetics is 
a form of explanation that purports to infer the causes of the observed primary 
homologies.  
 The four theories and theoretical frameworks introduced above have been deeply 
influential in my work. With hindsight they have proved very efficient in disentangling 
metaphysical issues in systematics. I have always attempted to discover how I could 
weave interactions between them. However, I have also been confronted to situations 
when these philosophical tools do not apply readily to systematics. Instead of discarding 
them, I choose to interpret them in a philosophically unorthodox way. This is the reason 
why some of the following articles are not confined to systematics and should also be 
perceived as philosophical contributions.  
 
SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES 
The first article of this compendium addresses some problems that stem from the 
inappropriate use of the Linnaean classification. The next articulates some objections 
against recent recommendations on increased stability in the PhyloCode. In the reminding 
articles I work inside the framework of phylogenetic nomenclature without accepting all 
the conventions imposed by the PhyloCode, most notably and for some obvious reasons 
in the paper which bears on the species issue.  
 
ARTICLE 1: Taxonomic surrogacy in biodiversity assessments, and the meaning of 
Linnaean ranks, Y. Bertrand, F. Pleijel & G.R. Rouse, 2006, Systematics and 
Biodiversity, 4: 149-159. 
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Contrary to the general feeling that could arise upon reading this article, I want to state 
from the outset that it does not advocate rejecting the Linnaean system in favor of the 
PhyloCode. It conveys a rather different message, that the Linnaean groups cannot fulfill 
some tasks they were not designed for in the first place. In particular, it castigates the 
method known as taxonomic surrogacy, which is based on the idea that species numbers 
need not be assessed directly, but can be estimated indirectly by counting higher ranked 
taxa, such as genera, families or orders. Taxonomic surrogacy has been advocated by a 
number of authors (e.g., Andersen, 1995; Balmford et al., 1996a; Balmford et al., 1996b; 
Balmford et al., 2000; Gaston & Williams, 1993; Lee, 1997; Warwick, 1988; Williams & 
Gaston, 1994) in several quite unrelated disciplines such as palaeontology, for identifying 
the magnitude of extinction events, in community perturbation, for detecting pollution 
effects and in conservation, for predicting patterns of biodiversity hotspots.  
 The taxonomic surrogacy approach is based on the premise that there are 
predictable relationships between species and higher taxonomic ranks and that the higher 
taxon counts allows predicting species richness with a reasonable amount of precision. 
Suppose that we know the species richness for a number of sites. Based on existing 
classifications we can, for each site, compare species richness with, say, family richness 
and then calculate the regression line giving family richness as a function of species 
richness. This relation is conjectured to hold constant for other taxa and other sites, where 
in turn species richness is estimated from family richness.  
 In our article we demonstrate that there are no empirical, nor theoretical, reasons 
for the above relation between species and higher taxa to remain constant enough to be of 
practical value. We trace the origin of the method to an erroneous belief in some sort of 
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equivalence between taxa of the same rank, which misrepresents the underlying tree and 
the historical nature of taxa. Thus, one genus in one part of the tree is not equivalent to 
another genus in another part of the tree, no more (and no less) than the genus Rattus is 
equivalent to the phylum Arthropoda; these names merely make reference to different 
historical events. The only information present in two taxon names of the same rank is 
that they are non-nested.  
 Moreover this method fails to recognize that knowledge of the classification is not 
an incremental development toward the most accurate classificatory scheme of the 
natural world. Quite the opposite in fact, the classification is characterized by a large 
historical inertia, keeping in its taxa the signs of past theories that researchers were 
committed to. Examples of taxa recognized in the early era of systematics that are still in 
use today abound. For instance, the works of de Candolle, Jussieu, Bentham and Hooker 
still influence contemporary botany to a high degree. Augustin-Pyramus de Candolle 
(1778-1841) believed that variation in Nature was discontinuous and therefore taxa 
should be recognized as discrete and real. He emphasized that the numbers of individuals 
in species, species in genera, or genera in families, did not affect the ranks of those taxa 
and suggested ranking should be based on an equivalent value of morphological 
variation. In other worlds, the included variation in each family should be equivalent, 
albeit higher than the amount of variation that characterizes genera (Stevens, 1994). In 
contrast, Bentham and Hooker in their Genera plantarum, were actively dismembering 
large groups and lumping small groups, deemed respectively too large to be conveniently 
handled and too small to be informative. Another influential botanist of the 19th century is 
Antoine-Laurent de Jussieu (1748-1836), who conceptualized relations between taxa as a 
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continuous and linear scala of increased perfection. He argued that due to the continuity 
of Nature, systematists could manipulate the size of groups at will and any delimitation 
was as justified as any other, which entailed that the size of taxa was based primarily on 
subjective convenience criteria.  
This short review illustrates how taxonomic philosophy has varied over time, but 
it could still be argued that a classification progressing toward the true representation of 
relationships in nature might emerge from the accumulation of observation data. 
However Stevens (1994: 487) casts serious doubts on this view when he explains that 
“[A]lthough new data have been added to classifications over the years, given that there 
is neither any clear way of evaluating data nor or representing the data on which a 
particular classification was based, relating classification to observations is no simple 
task. Knowledge of character variation is not cumulative; knowledge can also be lost.” 
 Although this paper is coated in a practical disguise, it is first and foremost an 
attempt to spell out the position that systematics is guided by certain personal orientations 
and contextual developments in the field, which traces are trapped in the classification 
and passed from one generation of scientists to the next.  
 
ARTICLE 2: Stability and universality in the application of taxon names in phylogenetic 
nomenclature, Y. Bertrand & M. Härlin, 2006, Systematic Biology, 55: 848-858. 
One of the main issues opposing proponents of the phylogenetic system and defenders of 
the rank based system pertains to the problem of content stability, i.e. stability in the 
extension of names. The claim that the rank based system is more stable than the 
phylogenetic system is a recurrent critic (Moore, 1998; Benton, 2000; Nixon and 
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Carpenter, 2000; Dyke, 2002; Carpenter, 2003; Kojima, 2003; Moore, 2003; Nixon et al., 
2003) which drove into the PhyloCode the addition of mechanisms that should promote 
content stability: crown-clades, qualifying clauses and the inflation of specifiers. 
In this article we argue that the recent overemphasis on stability in the PhyloCode 
contradicts its original precepts and hampers our abilities to unambiguously identify the 
taxa referred to by the phylonames. We focus on the inflation of specifiers which is the 
practice of using multiple specifiers in phylogenetic definitions. It is based on the 
assumption that the more specifiers that are included in a definition the more stable in 
terms of taxon content the reference of the name tends to be, i.e. the name will 
necessarily refer to all its specifiers. By using names defined with large number of 
specifiers, we show that in an overwhelming number of published phylogenies on these 
taxa, their names could not be applied unambiguously, that is, their exact 
circumscriptions were unclear. The reason is that phylogeneticists do not necessarily use 
the same taxa in their analyses as the one appearing as specifiers. Although, it may be 
argued (Cantino & Olmstead, 2008) that it is not necessary for all specifiers to be present 
in order for a name to be applied, we believe such an argument to severely impoverish 
the clarity of phylogenetic nomenclature. That is, too many applications are possible for 
each name in a single tree. This suggests that the door is wide open for ambiguity and 
thus threatening the very reason for moving to phylogenetic nomenclature in the first 
place. We conclude our article by recommending restraining the inflation of specifiers in 
phylogenetic definitions.  
 Our article was criticized by Cantino & Olmstead (2008), who defended 
the position that external knowledge of the phylogenetic tree can provide information 
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about the position of missing specifiers. For instance, despite that the tree in Kaufmann 
and Wink (1994) does not include pollen morphology in the data matrix, Nepetoidea 
(defined as “the most inclusive crown clade exhibiting exhibiting hexacolpate pollen 
synapomorphic with that in Nepeta cataria”) can still be applied to a part of the tree 
based on the distribution of hexacopate pollen in Lamiaceae tabulated by Cantino and 
Sanders (1986). In this case, pollen distribution would be used as a surrogate for locating 
a character transformation on the tree. Since an optimized character was not part of the 
search for character congruence during the phylogenetic analysis, it is not logically 
equivalent to a synapomorphy, but this is a minor quibble. We do not dispute that a 
knowledgeable taxonomist is fluent in the literature pertaining to his group and has no 
difficulties to draw a cogent conjecture about the position of missing specifiers. 
Instead, what our paper argues, is that the vast majority of users of taxonomic 
names, now and in the future, are non-specialists lacking precisely this taxonomic 
expertise, i.e. they are taxonomic and nomenclatural consumers (not producers). As we 
see it, a major gain of switching to phylogenetic nomenclature comes from the automatic 
feature of taxon re-identification. Such simplicity is necessary when loads of new 
molecular phylogenetic hypotheses are produced every day while, at the same time, 
trained taxonomists are cruelly lacking. Put bluntly, there just can’t be a taxonomist 
behind every phylogenetist’s shoulder. The crucial point is that we are not downplaying 
the role of taxonomy in modern systematics, rather the opposite! Taxonomy operates 
during the establishment of the initial phylogenetic definition and allows for periodic 
readjustments that are necessary to realign new phylogenetic insights with the needs of 
the scientific community. These adjustments take the form of modifications in 
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phylogenetic definitions (restricted and unrestricted emendations, see the article 15. in the 
version 4b of the PhyloCode) that are now allowed by the PhyloCode and defended 
already by Härlin (1998). 
In conclusion, the taxonomic expertise that establishes the definition and the 
application of the definitions by the end users, are two different aspects of biological 
systematics that do not concern the same categories of researchers. Our point of view is 
that when coining their definitions taxonomists should take into consideration the users’ 
needs and practices. 
 
ARTICLE 3: Species individuality and integration, Y. Bertrand, manuscript. 
Ghiselin’s (1966) seminal work is not just a key text in philosophy, it shacked the 
very foundations of biological ontology inherited from classical thinkers. He proposed 
that species should be understood as individuals rather than natural kinds. He drew 
several conclusion from this view: “If species are individuals, then: 1) their names are 
proper, 2) there cannot be instances of them, 3) they do not have defining properties 
(intensions), 4) their constituent organisms are parts, not members”(Ghiselin, 1974: 536). 
Two decades of debate on the proper requirements for individuality allowed Mishler and 
Brandon (1987) to adduce four properties for individuals: spatial boundedness (having 
edges), temporal boundedness (having beginnings and ends), integration and cohesion. 
Integration and cohesiveness have later been questioned by Ghiselin (1997) who 
suggested that individually, entails merely spatiotemporal boundedness and temporally 
continuity. 
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Lee and Wolsan (2002) launched a line of criticisms when they argued that 
without integration as a necessary property of individuals, Ghiselin’s redefinition leads to 
a paradox. They reasoned that if individuals are not necessarily integrated entities, then 
lower level individuals that are composing species need not be integrated either. That is, 
if the loss of integration between organisms in a species does not mean the end of the 
species then the loss of integration between the cells of an organism does not mean the 
death of the organism. And, since the lowest level individuals of a species are eternal 
fundamental particles, we are forced to agree that species are eternal as well. Therefore, if 
species are eternal, they cannot be spatiotemporally restricted, and consequently they 
cannot be individuals. 
In this paper, I present an argument that counters Lee and Wolsan’s proof and still 
preserves Ghiselin stricter definition of individuality. This argument explores the thesis 
that species (and clades) are best perceived as mereological sums of individuals 
(Brogaard, 2004), which means that each biological individual (in Ghiselin’s restricted 
sense) is the unique individual composed of all its less inclusive individuals and nothing 
more, i.e. any part of it overlaps one or more of the individuals that are composing it 
(Lewis, 1986). These less inclusive individuals are, just to name a few, the population 
individuals, cellular individuals, genetic individuals. The species-as-mereological-sum 
thesis (MST) allows both to retain the stricter definition of individuality and to argue that 
integration is a necessary feature of species. However in my framework, integration does 
not occur synchronically between the organisms in the species, but diachronically 
between all the lineages that together make up the sum, i.e. behavior, organism, cell, 
chromosome, gene lineages, etc. 
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Furthermore, I discuss in this article the consequences of the mereological sum 
thesis when applied within the framework of the General Lineage Species Concept 
(GLSC) (de Queiroz, 1998, 1999, 2005, 2007). The GLSC aims to unify diverse 
contemporary views on the nature of species by suggesting that they all agree on the 
underlying species ontology, namely, that species are segments of metapopulation-level 
lineages, whereas they disagree on the properties used to recognize the lineages. 
Although de Queiroz’s intuition brings some light in the species debate, it also implies 
that the current species definitions are all valid in the sense that they point to different 
evolutionary events. Hence the GLSC is committed to a form of pluralism with respect to 
the phyly (mono/para/polyphyly) of species taxa. In the MST framework, the cohesion of 
the sum results from the presence of a particular lineage that unites organisms into a 
whole. The causal lineage is always continuous, in contrast the organism lineage might 
present some discontinuity and lead to paraphyletic groups of organisms. The MST also 
emphasizes that since, ontologically speaking, species are not different from clades they 
should be allowed to form a hierarchy of more or less inclusive, possibly overlapping 
species taxa. Admittedly such pluralism cannot be embraced in the framework of the 
Linnaean system and I end the article with a plea for a whole different approach of 
species nomenclature.  
 
ARTICLE 4: Contrasting the general with the particular in phylogenetics - a proposal to 
keep the meanings of mono/paraphyletic and clade/grade separated, Y. Bertrand, 
2008, Taxon, 57: 705-708. 
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This short article moves on to explore the ontology of supra specific taxa in the 
framework of phylogenetic nomenclature. My analysis begins with the observation that 
clade and monophyletic group are often used as two interchangeable terms, yet from their 
uses one can notice that they sometimes single out distinct objects. I propose to separate 
their meanings in order to direct attention on two fundamental kinds of entities in 
systematics, which mark the difference between individuals and natural kinds. Along 
these lines I suggest to use “monophyletic” for an epithet referring to a defining property 
of a set (a natural kind) and “clade” for a noun which corresponds to a historical entity 
(an individual) resulting from evolutionary process. 
There is a large agreement on the concept of monophyly which is defined as 
“[T]he condition that a taxon or other group of organisms contains the most recent 
common ancestor of the group and all of its descendants…” (Hickman et al., 2006). 
However the meaning of clade is less consensual. I suggest it should apply to a single 
conceptualization of biological history, which implies that a clade is defined by its 
conjectured ancestor, its hypothesized topology and branch length. Modifying any of 
these features amounts to selecting a different clade. 
According to this proposal, to hold that (A, B, C) is a monophyletic group is to 
predicate this group with the property “contains an ancestor and all the descendants of 
that ancestor”. Thus, monophyly is a relational property that hypothesizes a particular 
evolutionary relation between taxa inside a group. But, a hypothesis of a monophyletic 
group encompasses several hypotheses of evolutionary history between the taxa. That is, 
according to the account presented here, it contains several possible clades, each of which 
had originated with a different ancestor. To talk about the monophyletic group (A, B, C) 
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amounts to discourse about a set containing the following clades ((AB)C), (A(BC)), 
((AC)B) which do not merely represent different topologies, but really different 
hypotheses of history. I conclude that monophyly could be understood as the defining 
property of a natural kind whose members are clades. 
 
ARTICLE 5: Phylogenetic hypotheses, taxonomic sameness and the reference of taxon 
names, Y. Bertrand & M. Härlin, 2008, Zoologica Scripta, 37: 337-347. 
The conceptual distinction developed above, between a clade and a monophyletic 
group paved the way for understanding how we are able to communicate with each other 
and this despite the fact that the names’ references, namely the clades figuring in 
phylogenetic hypotheses, change frequently when trees are revised. This means that the 
extension of a name is modified every time the phylogenetic hypothesis wherein the 
name can be applied is altered. Then a scientist using the name at some time before the 
change is not saying the same thing as a scientist using it at a time after the change, even 
when they utter exactly the same sentence. The upshot is that if the entities, to which the 
name corresponds, are different it bears on the question whether we should keep the 
name constant. In the PhyloCode’s framework we have two options. The first possibility 
keeps the definition constant and associate it with a different name. This is done in order 
to underline that we are dealing with two distinct entities belonging to two different 
phylogenetic contexts. The second possibility keeps the same name for different 
phylogenies, but emends the definition to capture a similar extension. Although this latest 
option is now possible according to the article 15 in the PhyloCode, I want to call 
attention to the fact that the identity of clades implies more than mere correspondence in 
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term of content. For two clades to be identical they must correspond to the same 
evolutionary history, that is, they need also to have the same internal relationships. Here 
enters Kripke and the causal theory of reference. Kripke argued that although the 
extension of a theoretical term might vary over time its meaning remains stable. The 
reason is that its meaning do not stem from its description, but is given by its referent. 
Moreover because theoretical terms such as the names of individuals and natural kinds 
are rigid designators, their associations with their referents are kept constant in time. As 
we have seen it these associations are established by ostension. This picture implies that 
scientists can fix the extension of kinds while knowing next to nothing about their 
properties and can learn about them after the kind was dubbed. It also implies that latter 
scientists might correct past workers’ views, as explained by Kripke (1980: 121): “…so 
we might also find out that tigers had none of the properties by which we originally 
identified them. Perhaps none are quadrupedal, none tawny yellow, none carnivorous, 
and so on; all these properties turn out to be based on optical illusions or other errors…” 
Therefore the name is always fixed to the same entity but our conceptualization of the 
entities’ properties varies along with scientific discoveries. For Kripke the name is in fine 
attached to an essence which causes the existence of the very entity. Kripke thought that 
species should be considered as natural kinds, but did not propose any clear essence for 
them. Other philosophers hold that the essence of a species is found in the species-
specific microstructure of its members. Putnam (1975), for example, speculates that the 
essence of lemons is the unique genetic code of lemons.  
In the case of names defined by phylogenetic nomenclature, the Kripke/Putnam 
thesis would imply that we fix a name to a real clade, i.e. part of the tree of life as it 
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effectively evolved. Then phylogenetics endeavors to match the real tree via successive 
ameliorations that refine our best phylogenetic hypotheses. In this paper we argue that 
this is a wrong picture of taxonomy: Even if the tree of life is real, it does not necessarily 
follow that taxonomy deals with real clades, only with hypotheses about clades. New 
phylogenetic hypotheses will be advanced, some will require extensive readjustments and 
some will be thrown aside, without any hints on how far off they are from the real 
ontological tree. Once it is recognized that systematics deals with hypotheses, we can 
investigate what is kept constant, what could serve as a stable reference across 
hypotheses. According to our analysis, it is blatantly clear that none of the components 
usually associated with a clade, namely an ancestor, a tree topology or taxon content, are 
necessarily constant across hypotheses. 
So what is the referent of a phylogenetic name? Should we discard the causal 
theory of reference in systematics and search for a different explanation of the persistence 
of communication despite hypotheses fluctuation?  
 The solution we propose is inspired by the previous article and the differences 
between clades and monophyletic groups. We suggest that a phyloname is not attached to 
a single clade but to a natural kind containing as members the clades that would be 
selected in counterfactual phylogenies. The defining properties of this natural kind are 
constructed out of the specifiers, the type of definition and information such as qualifying 
clauses, all provided by the phylogenetic definition.  
An example might clarify this new role for natural kinds in systematics. Consider 
Cladia, defined with a node-based definition as “the least inclusive clade containing 
specifiers A and B”, then the name Cladia is fixed by the two specifiers and the node-
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based definition. With the additional terminal C, the possible hypotheses containing these 
specifiers are (AB), (A)(BC)), and (B)(AC). Therefore, A, B and the phylogenetic 
definition fix the name Cladia to the natural kind [(AB), (A(BC)), (B(AC)], whose 
defining properties are A and B performing as specifiers in a node-based definition. This 
class is then the referent of the name. Depending on the phylogenetic hypothesis under 
consideration, Cladia applies only to one of the members of this natural kind in each 
phylogenetic hypothesis. 
 
ARTICLE 6: Historicism and essentialism in phylogenetic biology, Y. Bertrand & M. 
Härlin, manuscript. 
The last article of the compendium starts the discussion where the previous paper 
finished off and asks how the previous conclusion, namely that phylonames are fixed to 
natural kinds, can still hold in cases of definitional emendations. Redefinitions pose a 
threat to any form of natural kind theory, because it implies that past workers were 
mistaken in supposing that there is such a kind. One of the solutions is a hybrid account 
between the causal and the descriptive theories of reference (Sterelny, 1983). Such theory 
supposes that the researcher actually rely on the referent plus some description reflecting 
the true essence of the kind, when they determine the meaning of names. When the 
reference is too out of sync with the associated description, the researcher might decide to 
reground the term into a different entity.  
LaPorte (2004) proposes a different solution. He answers that the causal theory is 
correct, but the claim that we discover the true essence of kinds is wrong. He illustrates 
with the guinea-pig example which according to some phylogenetic hypotheses is not 
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part of the clade including all traditionally recognized myomorph rodents. Instead, the 
guinea-pig and the myomorph rodents diverged before the separation between myomorph 
rodents and the lineage leading to primates and artiodactyls (Graur et al., 1991). As a 
consequence, scientists might select any of the following option: a) retain the extension 
of rodent and accept the conclusion that the guinea-pig is not a rodent, b) adjust the 
extension and encompass horses and humans into the rodent clade in order to preserve 
guinea-pig’s “rodenthood”. LaPorte asserts that any of the above options is perfectly 
valid, which entails that there is no fact of the matter about which is the right one. This 
leads him to the anti-Kripkean conclusion that new evidences do not tell us something 
about what we were referring to before we collected the evidence. From this account, it is 
clear that past and current workers mean something different when using ‘Rodent’. 
Because often there are several equally good options, we cannot say that in the past it was 
false that a guinea-pig was a rodent. For LaPorte it was simply vague and we couldn’t 
cogently decide. Now with the change of meaning, it has become precise and according 
to the selected option we can answer about the truthiness of the statement “the guinea-pig 
is a rodent”.  
 In our article, we take elements from both the hybrid theory and LaPorte’s view. 
However we challenge LaPorte’s argument that the different alternatives facing the 
taxonomist, were equally good options to select from. We put forth the idea that scientists 
are driven when making reference change by the will to narrate the same sort of history, 
in other words, by the will to keep the role of taxa as similar as possible in their 
successive applications. It doesn’t imply that they never take the responsibility of deeply 
modifying extensions of names. A famous example is Dinosauria which used to be the 
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central subject in some paleontological explanation. Its current extension encompasses 
extent birds; therefore the name plays a new role in explanations pertaining to some 
living flying vertebrates. 
 When the taxonomists’ needs are taken into consideration we are forced to modify 
the ontological picture of taxa presented in the fifth article. A taxon is not a single natural 
kind defined by one phylogenetic definition, but a collection of several natural kinds 
corresponding to the successive redefinitions. All together these natural kinds form an 
entity which we call narrative. In a narrative, integration of the different kinds into a 
whole proceeds from the systematist’s desire to tell a good story.  
 
CONCLUSION 
I remember using in my very first article on the PhyloCode (Bertrand & Pleijel, 
2003) the worn out discussion between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:  
““When I use a word”, Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just 
what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”. 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.” (Carroll, 1872: 124).” 
This article concludes by agreeing with Humpty Dumpty that language is a convention 
but responds to Alice’s worry that once a definition is given to a word, their association 
should remain fixed. Then, I ended by advertising how well the fixity of the association is 
secured in the PhyloCode, which allows us to cease arguing about definitions and to 
finally focus on phylogenies.  
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Nothing in this quotation strikes me as exactly wrong even now; but what strikes 
me is that I was walking on the razor’s edge without knowing it. In the intervening years 
I have come to see that one cannot come to grips with the real problems in nomenclature 
and systematics in general without being more sensitive to the philosophical standpoint 
than I was willing to be when I wrote those words. Becoming more sensitive to that 
position had consequences which I did not expect. During my thesis, I have encountered 
that names can refer to individuals, to natural kinds, or even to narratives. I have explored 
how our knowledge of the world is partly imposed by nature, partly built by consensus 
between scientists. I have understood that taxa have or lack essential properties 
depending from where we are observing them. I hope that the reader is now convinced 
that phylogenetic nomenclature is a fantastic tool when it comes to explore the ontology 
and epistemology of systematics.  
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